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Relevance of Shari’ah Governance
in Driving Performance of Islamic
Banks during the Financial Crisis:
International Evidence
Naji Mansour Nomran and Razali Haron
Abstract
This study aims to examine the impact of Shari’ah governance mechanism on the
performance of Islamic banks (IBs) during the financial crisis of 2008. Data were
collected from 66 IBs over 18 countries covering the period of 2007–2015 and
analyzed using the System-GMM estimator. The findings indicate that an increase
in SSB effectiveness increases IBs’ performance even during the crisis periods. A
possible justification for this positive effect is related to the SG structure of IBs that
allows them to undertake higher risks to achieve a high efficiency level. For this, the
IBs, policymakers and practitioners should consider these findings when aiming to
improve SG practices in the Islamic banking industry, which in turn may help in
protecting IBs during crisis and non-crisis periods. More specifically, they should
give due importance to SSB (size, cross-membership, educational qualification,
reputation and expertise) in enhancing the performance of IBs during the crisis and
non-crisis periods. This study provides additional evidence on how IBs can sustain
their performance during either crisis or non-crisis periods through adopting
appropriate SG structure. However, the study only focuses on a small sample of 66
IBs due to lack of the data.
Keywords: Shari’ah governance, Islamic banking, performance, global financial
crisis of 2008
1. Introduction
In the current practice, Islamic banks (IBs) are subject to two internal mecha-
nisms of CG: The Board of Directors (BoD) and the Shari’ah supervisory boards
(SSBs). This extra layer of governance in the IBs, as represented by SSB, modifies
their governance structure from a “single-layer” as in the conventional banks (CBs)
into a “multi-layer” governance [1, 2]. Abdelsalam et al. [3] argue that this dual
board structure strengthens both moral and legal accountabilities of IB manage-
ment, and then, it may reduce these banks’ risk. Therefore, the establishment of an
SSB for IBs is essential [4]. For the IBs, in order to enhance their customers’ trust,
they must guarantee that all their products and operations are in compliance with
the Shari’ah rules [5]. Shari’ah noncompliance can be a reason for reputational risk
that can make the Islamic finance sector susceptible to instability and can trigger
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bank failure as most of the customers prefer the IBs for religious reasons [6]. These
risks also include higher costs, financial losses, liquidity problems, bank runs, bank
failure, industry smearing and financial instability [6, 7].
Providing an efficient Shari’ah supervision is crucial to the IBs for failing to do so
may give negative impact on the Islamic finance industry as a whole; hence, the SSB
has high responsibility and accountability in its role with regard to Shari’ah super-
vision. If IBs fail to ensure compliance with the Shari’ah rules, their position in the
market will be negatively affected due to lack of customers’ confidence [8, 9]. It is
argued that one of the duties of SSB is to approve any new products before they go
for full scale development, which in turn would decrease the risks of Shari’ah
compatibility before developing the product [6]. New products will not be intro-
duced to the customers before they are approved by the SSB [10]. Risks can arise
when the product fails to meet market and customers’ needs. Given the importance
of SSBs for IBs, [11] claim that although some may compare SSB to BoD or to an
investment committee, SSBs have more powers and rights. Thus, the roles and
duties of SSB have no true equivalent in the West [11]. As such, [10] considers the
SSBs as the substitute for the conventional BoD. Furthermore, the SSB is expected
to advise the board, the management including the bank’s subsidiaries and provide
input to the bank on Shari’ah matters in order for the bank to comply with Shari’ah
principles at all times [12].
The SSB plays an important role in determining the performance of IBs [4] and
is responsible and accountable for all Shari’ah decisions, opinions and views pro-
vided by them to the IBs [12]. Given that SSB supervises bank investment, banks
cannot invest beyond the SSB-approved investments even if they can earn a higher
rate of returns [13]. The duties of the SSB include ensuring that the operations of
the banks do not involve any dealings in prohibited industries [14]. Furthermore,
the SSB has super authority to prevent the BoDs from charging interest (riba)
payments and avoiding doubtful (gharar) investments in their products [15].
According to [6], the use of products that breach the Shari’ah principles is costly to
the IBs in both the short run and the long run. In the short run, any revenue from
the transactions that are not Shari’ah compliant is excluded from the income of the
bank and donated to some charitable causes. Thus, Shari’ah noncompliance can
affect the income and profitability of IBs adversely. In the long run, the dilution of
Shari’ah principles can negatively affect the perception of stakeholders on the
Islamic financial practice causing a serious loss of trust and credibility [6]. The
nature of the SSBs’ decision may influence the acceptance of one product over
another; hence, the SSB approval could increase or decrease the volume of banking
business [4], which may affect the bank’s profitability [16]. The decision-making of
the management in the IBs is indeed constrained by an SSB that rejects any pro-
posals in light of Shari’ah principles [10].
The chapter is organized into four sections. The first section deals with the
related literature and the hypotheses development. The second presents the data
and methodology, while the third discusses the empirical result. The last section
concludes the whole study.
1.1 Internal corporate governance mechanisms and financial crisis of 2008
In the current practices, CBs are not operating alone in the market as IBs have
become their most competitive rival [17]. Many observers and industry players
have shifted their interests toward the Islamic financial system as a viable alterna-
tive to the conventional one after the series of failures of several conventional
financial institutions due to the crisis of 2008 [18]. Parallel with that attention, the
importance of CG implementations has increased in the business environment
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especially after the financial crises, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the global
financial crisis of 2008. According to [18], as the financial transactions in the
Islamic system are trade and asset based, it is assumed that this system will be more
resilient to the financial shocks. Despite this, there are many examples of Islamic
financial institutions (IFIs) that suffer from poor CG especially during crisis
periods. The fall of Ihlas Finance House of Turkey in 2001, South Africa’s IB in 1997
and the Dubai Islamic IB’s losses between 2004 and 2007 are the clearest evidences
of the IFI’s poor governance [9, 19]. Many scholars argue that poor CG of financial
institutions is one of the main causes of the financial crisis of 2008 [20]. It is now
widely acknowledged that shortcomings in bank CG may have had a central role in
the development of the crisis [21].
The CG weaknesses and strengths are determined by many factors especially the
CG mechanisms. Therefore, companies that have strong CG mechanisms tend to be
more successful as compared to those companies having weak corporate mecha-
nisms [22]. Accordingly, companies that have effective corporate boards during
crisis periods are more likely to introduce turnaround plans [23]. As Abatecola et al.
[24] assert, most of the empirical studies confirm that corporate board characteris-
tics increase the survival probabilities of companies during crisis periods.
Kowalewski [23] provides empirical evidence on how CG mechanisms operate
differently in crisis and non-crisis periods. Adding to that, Srivastava [25] finds
that BoD affects the company’s performance, particularly during the period of
financial crisis.
Being considered that IBs are subject to two internal mechanisms of CG, the BoD
and the SSB, it is paramount to provide insights on how SSB influences the IBs’
performance during crisis periods. In general, most of the empirical studies in the
literature have given attention to the BoD, while there is a lack of studies in the SSB
context. As Nomran and Haron [26] argue, there is a need for more empirical
studies to examine whether the effect of SSB on IB’s performance differs during
crisis periods, especially the financial crisis of 2008. They add that this would help
IBs in developing their strategies to adopt an appropriate SSB structure that will
sustain their performance.
Few studies, however, have so far been focused on CG structure of IBs and link
it to their performance during crisis such as the study of [15]. In this study, Mollah
et al. [15] investigate whether the CG structure of IBs can help them in reducing the
impact of the crisis of 2008. To do so, they examined the impact of the CG1 on
performance of the IBs vs. CBs and found that the SSB size influences the IBs’
performance positively during the crisis period. They argue that the SG diminishes
the negative impact of excessive risk taking and then improves the IBs’ perfor-
mance [15]. However, Nomran and Haron [27] claim that the study of [15] suffers
from some limitations such as it used the SSB size as a single proxy of SSB gover-
nance and neglected many important SSB characteristics that may affect the board
performances. Thus, Nomran and Haron [27] overcome this limitation by using an
SSB score that takes into consideration the impact of other important SSB charac-
teristics. Similarly, the current study also uses this SSB score to measure SSB super-
vision as it will be shown in the methodology.
Basically, IBs have unique framework against the backdrop of Shari’ah ruling
that plays an important role in their resilience. The CG structure of IBs, which
includes the SG, helps them undertake higher risks and decrease the effect of the
crisis on their profitability [15]. Alman [28] asserts that taking the crisis period into
1
BoD structure (board size and independence), CEO power (chair duality and internally recruited) and
SSB size.
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account while studying the impact of SSB is important. Thus, there is an open
empirical research question as to whether the SSB supervision, as measured by an
SSB score that takes into consideration the impact of the important SSB
characteristics2, contributes to better performance of IBs during crisis periods.
2. Hypotheses development
Literature reveals that comparing the impact of the SSB on IBs’ performance
during crisis periods has not been fully investigated in previous studies. Responding
to what has been discussed above, this chapter aims to extend the investigation of
[15] by examining the impact of SSB supervision on IBs’ performance during crisis
periods by focusing on the financial crisis of 2008.
2.1 Shari’ah supervision and bank performance
The SSB has a supra authority to prevent the BoDs from charging interest (riba)
payments and to avoid doubtful (gharar) investments in their products [15].
Although economic calculation and the profit concerns of the IBs are allocated to
the BoD, the appreciation of the licit character of this profit is allocated to the SSB
[10]. Thus, SSBs play an important role in mitigating agency problems by acting as
an additional monitoring mechanism [3, 33, 34]. SSBs offer an extra possible
reduction in agency costs for IBs through organizational moral accountability con-
straints and shaping managerial behavior [3, 34]. As Mohammed and Muhammed
[4] state, SSB is one of the four key stakeholders affecting the financial performance
of IBs, besides the management, the ownership and the external auditor.
As mentioned above, SSB characteristics, for example, SSB size, cross-
membership, doctoral qualification, reputation and expertise, may determine how
effective the SSB is in performing its task [19, 32, 35]. Basically, SSBs’ total effect
should be measured using an SSB measurement that can reflect the total effect of
SSB based on the most important characteristics that affect SSBs’ performance [26].
Based on that, many studies used SSB score that captures the total impact of these
SSB characteristics to measure SSB supervision, for examples [19, 27]. Recently,
Nomran and Haron [27] find that SSBs positively affect Southeast Asia IBs’ perfor-
mance. That is to say that, SSB score provides the basis for the following hypotheses:
H1: Effective SSB, as represented by the SSB score, will be positively associated with
IBs’ performance.
H2: Effective SSB, as represented by the SSB score, will be positively associated with
IBs’ performance even for the period during the financial crisis of 2008.
3. Data and methodology
3.1 Sample
This chapter uses an unbalanced panel data of 66 IBs over 18 countries over the
period 2007–2015 after eliminating banks with insufficient data on Shari’ah gover-
nance and performance. We choose the sample’s starting period of 2007 in order to
2
Several variables relating to the SSB characteristics may determine how effective the SSB is in
conducting its task, namely, SSB size, doctoral qualification, reputation, cross-membership and expertise
[29, 19, 30–32].
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capture the effect of the financial crisis of 2008; therefore, the study covers the
period from 2007 to 2015, including crisis period (2007–2009) following the previ-
ous studies such as [36]. The data are merged from BankScope and World Bank
country-level macroeconomic data with hand-collected data on SSB characteristics
from annual reports of IBs for the sample period. The sample distribution is
presented in Table 1.
3.2 Measures of variables
In this study, the dependent variable, which is the performance of IBs, is mea-
sured by ROA and ROE following the previous studies [15, 32].
The explanatory variables used are measured as the following. Shari’ah supervi-
sion is measured using SSB score [27]. The bank characteristics (size and age) and
country-specific variables (GDP and inflation rate) that may affect performance are
employed as control variables following previous research [15, 27]. Table 2 provides
a summary of the measurements of the dependent, control and explanatory vari-
ables used in this study.
3.3 Estimation method and model
This chapter employs the two-step system generalized method of moments
(GMM). Studies on the relationships between CG and performance should control
Country No of Islamic banks
Algeria 1
Bahrain 9
Bangladesh 6
Bosnia 1
Brunei Darussalam 1
Indonesia 2
Jordan 3
Kuwait 2
Malaysia 11
Maldives 1
Oman 4
Pakistan 9
Qatar 3
Sudan 6
Syria 2
Thailand 1
United Kingdom 3
Yemen 1
Total 66
Three of the four IBs in Oman are windows, but they have separate financial statements (Sohar Islamic, Muzn Islamic
& Meethaq Islamic).
Table 1.
Sample of the study.
5
Relevance of Shari’ah Governance in Driving Performance of Islamic…
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.92368
for endogeneity, and thereby GMM can be used to control for this issue [37, 38]. To
test the hypotheses, the following regression model is employed:
PERFORMit ¼ β0PERFORMit 1ð Þ þ β1SSB‐SCOREit þ β2BSIZEit þ β3BAGEit
þ β4GDPit þ β5INFLATIONit þ εit (1)
PERFORMit ¼ β0PERFORMit 1ð Þ þ β1SSB‐SCOREit þ β2SSB‐SCORE CRISISit
þ β3BSIZEit þ β4BAGEit þ β5GDPit þ β6INFLATIONit þ β7CRISISit
þ εit
(2)
where i indicates the IBs (i = 1,… .,66) and t indicates the annual time period
(t = 2007,… .,2015), PERFORM = performance of IBs, SSB-SCORE = Shari’ah
supervision score, SSB-SCORE  CRISIS = interaction term between SSB score and
financial crisis3, BSIZE = bank size, BAGE = bank age, GDP = gross domestic
product, INFLATION = inflation rate, CRISIS = a dummy variable: “1” for the
period 2007–2009, “0” otherwise4 and ε = error term.
Variables Definitions and coding Measurement
Dependent variables (bank performance)
ROA Return on assets Net income divided by average total assets
ROE Return on equity Net income divided by average total equity
Explanatory and control variables
SSB-SCORE Shari’ah supervision score SSB-SIZE+SSB-CRM + SSB-DQ + SSB-REP+ SSB-
EXPER*
SSB-SCORE
 CRISIS
Interaction term between SSB score
and financial crisis
SSB score multiplied by dummy variable: “1” for
the period 2007–2009, “0” otherwise
BSIZE Bank size Log of total assets
BAGE Bank age Log of years since the bank was established
GDP Gross domestic product Log of GDP per capita
INFLATION Inflation Inflation rate
CRISIS Financial crisis A dummy variable: “1” for the period 2007–
2009, “0” otherwise
*The SSB score sums the value of the dichotomous characteristics of the SSB, which takes a score bounded by 0–1,
namely (SSB size: “1” for banks with 5 or more members & “0” otherwise), (SSB cross-membership: “1” if at least one
SSB scholar with cross-membership & “0” otherwise), (SSB educational qualification: “1” if at least one SSB scholar
with PhD & “0” otherwise), (SSB reputation: “1” if at least one SSB scholar sits on the SSB of AAOIFI and at least
two Shari’ah board memberships & “0” otherwise) and (SSB expertise: “1” if at least one SSB scholar with experience
and knowledge in the field of accounting/economic/finance & “0” otherwise).
SSB-SIZE = SSB size; SSB-CRM = SSB cross-membership; SSB-DQ = SSB educational qualification; SSB-REP = SSB
reputation; SSB-EXPER = SSB expertise.
Table 2.
Measurement of variables.
3
Dummy interaction is employed following literature [39].
4
To capture the crisis impact, dummy interaction is employed following literature, in which: “1” for the
period 2007–2009, otherwise “0” [31].
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4. Analysis and findings
4.1 Descriptive statistics
The results of descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 shows that the mean of dependent variables (ROA and ROE) are 0.358 and
8.776, respectively. Table 3 depicts that the mean of the SSB-SCORE is 3.399,
ranges from 0 to 5. This is in line with the findings of [27] who report that the mean
value of SSB-SCORE for GCC and Southeast Asia IBs is 3.500. Turning to the bank
and country variables (bank size, bank age, GDP and inflation rate), Table 3 shows
that the mean of these variables are 5.977, 0.983, 4.062 and 5.591, respectively.
4.2 Correlation
Table 4 denotes the Pearson correlation coefficients between the explanatory
variables. Based on Table 4, the highest correlation is found between INFLATION
and SSB-SCORE (r = 0.39). Table 4 also presents that all the correlation coefficients
are less than 0.95; hence, the collinearity between the variables is not a concern, as
suggested by [40]. According to Table 4, SSB-SCORE shows a significant correla-
tion with BAGE and INFLATION (p = 0.01). Further, INFLATION has a significant
Variables Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Performance variables
ROA 0.358 6.372 45.311 31.953
ROE 8.776 21.819 73.311 276.738
Explanatory and control variables
SSB-SCORE 3.399 1.020 0.000 5.000
BSIZE 5.977 0.668 3.335 7.591
BAGE 0.983 0.422 0.301 1.869
GDP 4.062 2.744 7.080 12.670
INFLATION 5.591 4.996 4.900 30.030
Number of IBs = 66; Number of observations = 381. ROA = return on asset; ROE = return on equity; SSB-
SCORE = Shari’ah supervision score, BSIZE = bank size, BAGE = bank age, GDP = gross domestic product,
INFLATION = inflation rate.
Table 3.
Descriptive statistics.
Variables SSB-SCORE BSIZE BAGE GDP INFLATION
SSB-SCORE 1
BSIZE 0.016 1
BAGE 0.144*** 0.062 1
GDP 0.051 0.056 0.029 1
INFLATION 0.395*** 0.178*** 0.187*** 0.041 1
***Correlation is significant at 1%.
Table 4.
Pearson correlations.
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correlation with BSIZE and BAGE (p = 0.01). Nomran and Haron [27] found similar
correlations for SSB-SCORE with the BAGE and INFLATION and for INFLATION
with the BSIZE and BAGE.
4.3 Diagnostic test
To check the existence of the multicollinearity issue, variance inflation factor
(VIF), as an indicator of multicollinearity, is used. Multicollinearity test in the data
set is performed and no multicollinearity problem is found in the data, as the VIF of
variables is less than 10 (refer Table 5). Based on this, there is no concern of
multicollinearity among the set of explanatory variables.
4.4 Hypotheses test
Table 5 presents the regression results examining the study hypotheses based on
the two-step system-GMM. Based on Table 5, the diagnostic tests show that the two
models (1 & 2) are well fitted as AR(1) and AR(2) satisfy the conditions that there is
first-order autocorrelation but no second-order, as suggested by the literature [32].
Table 5 also depicts that the models (1 & 2) are well fitted with statistically
significant test statistics for the Wald test, indicating that the instruments are valid
in the GMM estimation for the measurements (ROA, ROE) (Model 1: p = 0.00,
0.00; Model 2: p = 0.00, 0.00).
Additionally, the Hansen J-statistic test does not reject the null hypothesis at any
conventional level of significance for the two measurements (ROA, ROE) (Model 1:
p = 0.59, 0.59; Model 2: p = 0.70, 0.35), indicating that all the models have valid
instrumentation. Finally, in line with the rule of thumb [41], the number of instru-
ments does not outnumber the number of groups in all the models.
As expected in the first hypothesis (H1), SSB score is reported to relate positively
to performance as measured by ROA and ROE (Model 1: at p = 0.05, 0.01); thus, the
first hypothesis is supported. This result is in support of literature such as Nomran
and Haron [27] who found a positive impact for the SSB score on the performance
of Southeast Asia IBs.
For the second hypothesis (H2), a positive relationship is found between the SSB
score and performance in the presence of the financial crisis for all the measure-
ments (ROA, ROE) (all at p = 0.05); the second hypothesis is, thus, supported but
not at 1% level of significance. This result is consistent with the findings of [15],
who found a positive and significant impact for SSB supervision on the IBs’ perfor-
mance during the financial crisis. The results indicate that SSBs slightly enhance IBs’
performance during the financial crisis period. According to Mollah et al. [15], a
possible justification for this positive effect is related to the SG structure of IBs that
helps them undertake higher risks and decrease the effect of the crisis on their
profitability. Ben Zeineb and Mensi [42] also found that the governance structure of
IBs allows them to take higher risks to achieve a high efficiency level. Abedifar et al.
[43] believe that components of IBs’ governance systems may protect them from
the problems faced by CBs.
The findings, therefore, suggest that an increase in SSB effectiveness increases
IBs’ performance even during the crisis periods. For this, the IBs, policymakers and
practitioners should consider these findings when aiming to improve SG practices
in the Islamic banking industry, which in turn may help in protecting IBs during
crisis and non-crisis periods. They should give due importance to SSB characteris-
tics (size, cross-membership, educational qualification, reputation and expertise) in
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enhancing the performance of IBs. Regarding the appropriate SG structure, some
empirical studies have been conducted in this context. Nomran and Haron [2]
suggested that SSB size of IBs should neither be lesser than three nor greater than
six. Further, Nomran and Haron [27] confirmed that IBs should balance the number
of SSB scholars with experience in Shari’ah, as well as in law, accounting and
finance. They also indicated that scholars with PhD in Shari’ah and law are more
associated to enhance IBs’ performance. Finally, they indicated that IBs should
restrict the scholars’ memberships across SSBs.
Model (1) (2)
Variables ROA ROE ROA ROE
Constant 10.256*** [0.000] 67.202*** [0.000] 5.346 [0.191] 36.405** [0.014]
ROA (1) 0.343*** [0.000] — 0.404*** [0.000] —
ROE (1) — 0.384*** [0.000] — 0.396** [0.017]
SSB-SCORE 1.156** [0.025] 6.947*** [0.003] 0.875** [0.026] 4.420* [0.072]
SSB-SCORE 
CRISIS
— — 5.070** [0.049] 30.528** [0.031]
BSIZE 0.927*** [0.000] 6.738*** [0.000] 0.432 [0.423] 3.157 [0.282]
BAGE 0.465 [0.117] 1.331 [0.537] 0.160 [0.798] 2.085 [0.656]
GDP 0.114 [0.223] 0.213 [0.654] 0.128 [0.281] 0.267 [0.775]
INFLATION 0.160*** [0.001] 1.268*** [0.000] 0.081 [0.226] 1.010*** [0.004]
CRISIS — — 19.974* [0.060] 105.700** [0.044]
Wald test
(p-value) χ2
statistic
781.260*** (0.000) 155.370*** (0.000) 259.690*** (0.000) 119.410*** (0.000)
Hansen test
(p-value)
15.000 (0.595) 16.020 (0.591) 14.420 (0.701) 8.910 (0.350)
AR(1) (p-value) 1.760* (0.079) 1.750* (0.079) 1.770* (0.078) 1.720* (0.086)
AR(2) (p-value) 1.050 (0.292) 1.520 (0.128) 1.110 (0.266) 1.510 (0.130)
No. of instruments 24 25 27 17
No. of groups 62 62 62 62
No. of
observations
263 278 264 277
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
SSB-SCORE 1.21 1.20 1.43 1.44
BSIZE 1.06 1.05 1.07 1.06
BAGE 1.08 1.07 1.10 1.10
GDP 1.03 1.02 1.04 1.02
INFLATION 1.25 1.25 1.27 1.26
The GMM model includes one lag of the dependent variables. Standard coefficients are presented (p-values in
parentheses).
***, ** and * are the p-values significant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
ROA = return on assets; ROE = return on equity; SSB-SCORE = Shari’ah supervision score, BSIZE = bank size,
BAGE = bank age, GDP = gross domestic product, INFLATION = inflation rate. Model (1): Shows Eq. (1); Model (2):
Shows Eq. (2). Stata software was used for analyzing hypothesis test based on System-GMM.
Table 5.
SSB and IBs’ performance in the presence of the financial crisis: two-step system-GMM estimation.
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5. Conclusion
The importance of CG implementations has increased in the business environ-
ment especially after the financial crises: The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the
global financial crisis of 2008. Poor CG of financial institutions is considered to be
one of the main causes of the financial crisis of 2008, and this CG weakness was not
limited to the CBs, but IBs also suffered from this problem because their imple-
mentation of CG practices is still weak. Indeed, CG structure of IBs differs from its
conventional counterparts as it follows Shari’ah-compliant characteristics and is
closely guided by the SSBs. This extra layer of governance in the IBs modifies their
governance structure from “single-layer” as in the conventional ones into “multi-
layer” governance. This makes the establishment of an SSB essential for the IBs.
Providing an efficient Shari’ah supervision is crucial to the IBs as failing to do so
may give negative impact on the Islamic finance industry as a whole.
However, studies investigating the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 in the
SSB context are very little, and hence, this chapter aims to examine SSBs’ supervi-
sion effect on IBs’ performance during the financial crisis of 2008. Based on the
GMM estimation, the findings indicate that IBs with strong SSB supervision are
likely to improve IBs’ performance during the crisis and non-crisis periods.
It is expected that providing empirical evidence on this issue would help the IBs
in developing their strategies to adopt appropriate SG structure that can enhance
their performance during crisis and non-crisis periods. Therefore, the IBs,
policymakers and practitioners should consider the strong SSB supervision when
aiming to improve SG practices in the Islamic banking industry. More specifically,
the IBs, policymakers and practitioners should give due importance to SSB (size,
cross-membership, educational qualification, reputation and expertise) in enhanc-
ing the performance of IBs during the crisis and non-crisis periods. However, the
main limitation of the study is that it only focuses on a sample of 66 IBs over 18
countries due to lack of data.
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